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pliers to improve product quality, and brings lower prices to the motorist."'
Admittedly, unrestrained competition may lead to abuses. Price discrimina-
tion by a supplier may cause substantial harm to its outlets. However,
proceedings under the Robinson-Patman Act and actions by the FTC
should be able to meet this problem. An interpretation of the Robinson-
Patman Act in the light of its original purpose to help the small independent
businessman would probably be enough to protect the retailers' interest."1
2
The uniform withdrawal of competitive allowances should be scrutinized
for possible violations of the Sherman Act. However, a "rule of reason"
approach is suggested in appraising the validity of the concerted action
taken by the suppliers with the burden on the suppliers to prove rea-
sonableness. 1"3
Trade association and purported labor union activities of gasoline re-
tailers should be investigated. If the purpose of such organization is found
to be repugnant to state or federal policy, i.e., where the concentration of
selling power derived from the concerted action puts gasoline consumers
in the locale in an unequal bargaining capacity for gasoline, remedies com-
patible with freeing competition should obtain.
ELIMINATION OF ACCRUED DIVIDENDS: POSSIBLE
OBSTACLES FOR THE PENNSYLVANIA
CORPORATION
A business corporation which has been engulfed in a protracted period
of financial loss will frequently authorize and issue new common stock to
obtain the fresh funds necessary to rejuvenate itself, prevent a further down-
ward trend, and avail itself fully of the prospect for profits in the brighter
period ahead. Bank loans may be either unavailable because the corpora-
tion's earning record has not been good or else undesirable because of the
fixed financial burden the interest rate will place on the corporation whose
future earnings are only speculative. Thus, issuance of new securities may
be the only feasible way to obtain working capital. The corporation so
situated may find this avenue of financing blocked by large dividend arrear-
ages which have accrued on its cumulative preferred stock during its bleak
period. Investors, otherwise willing to speculate on the company's future
earnings, will be reluctant to do so where such earnings will go to the
preferred shareholders for an indefinite future period. Therefore, elimina-
tion or scaling down of dividend arrearages is dictated in such situations.
111. National Petroleum News, March 5, 1950, p. 10.
112. See AusTIN, PRicE DIscRIINATIoN 7 (1952).
113. For a list of factors to be considered in determining reasonableness, see
Smith, Effective Competitiom: Hypothesis for Modernizing the Antitrust Laws,
26 N.Y.U.L. REv. 405, 441 (1951).
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A recent decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,' defeating an
attempted corporate elimination of accrued dividends on preferred stock,
calls for a re-examination of the problems posed by such action. Three of
these will be considered: (a) corporate power to effect the elimination; (b)
the constitutional questions raised by statutes specifically authorizing the
elimination; and (c) achieving fairness to the dissenting preferred share-
holders where the elimination is allowed.
CORPORATE POWER
Three methods are available to eliminate accrued dividends: (1) direct
elimination by charter amendment; (2) merger and consolidation; and (3)
indirect elimination by amending the charter to provide for the issuance of
a new preferred, prior in dividends to the old, and allowing the preferred
shareholders to surrender their stock plus accrued dividends for the new
preferred. Since an amendment of the charter is necessary to effectuate
any of the plans, the statutory requirements for amendment must be fol-
lowed. The principal requirement is that a majority of each class of shares
vote in favor of the amendment.2 The bulk of the common stockholders
will, of course, agree to such an amendment, impelled by a desire to keep the
corporation alive and by the knowledge that their chance for a share of the
expected profits will be greatly improved by a complete or partial elimina-
tion of preferred dividend arrearages. To secure the consent of the pre-
ferred, however, it will probably be necessary to offer concessions attractive
enough to induce them to relinquish their accrued dividends. These con-
cessions will usually take the form of increasing their equity in the cor-
poration, by increasing the par value of their preferred, while holding the
dividend rate constant; or by giving them common stock in addition to their
preferred, thus increasing their proportion of the annual profits. They
may also be offered increased voting rights. The majority of the preferred
stockholders will thus be induced to concur in such an amendment by a
realization that all they have at present is a claim to doubtful future earn-
ings of a languishing business, whereas if they surrender their claim to ac-
crued dividends in return for a larger percentage in the equity of the cor-
poration, they will be in a position to claim the lion's share of very probable
future earnings of a revitalized corporation.
Although an overwhelming majority of the preferred shareholders may
vote in favor of the elimination of arrearages by one of the above methods,
indicating their belief that it is in their best interests and perhaps the best
1. Schaad v. Hotel Easton Co., 369 Pa. 486, 87 A.2d 227 (1952).
2. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2852-801(4), 804, 902(c) (Purdon 1939);
OEIo GEN. CoDE ANN. §8623-14, 15 (Page Supp. 1952) ; VA. CODE tit. 13, §§ 13-35,
37 (1950). In the case of merger the statutes generally provide for a simple majority
of all voting shares. However, since a demand by a large number of preferred
shareholders for appraisal and purchase of their shares would defeat the whole pur-
pose of the plan, it is practically necessary to obtain the consent of the bulk of pre-
ferred shareholders. See note 3 infra.
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interest of the corporate entity, a minority may dissent and insist on the
payment of their accrued dividends before any other dividends are paid by
the corporation. In certain instances these dissenters have the statutory
right to insist that their stock be appraised and purchased by the corpora-
tion for its fair market value.8 Even where such a remedy exists, dissenters
may contend that this is not an exclusive remedy, and attempt to enjoin the
operation of the plan on the ground that they have bargained for certainty
of income and a preferred position over other stockholders, and that the
attempted elimination violates their contract with the corporation and the
other stockholders. 4 The dissenting shareholder may precipitate litigation
by suing to enjoin the operation of the proposed plan or seeking a declara-
tion that as to his shares the accrued dividends must be paid before any
dividend payments can be made on any shares as they exist subsequent to
the consummation of the proposed plan.5
The question of whether and in what manner accrued dividends may
be eliminated has been viewed by courts simply as one of power under the
corporation charter, which, for this discussion, will be taken to include both
the articles of incorporation and the corporation laws of the state,6 for it is
here that the preferred stock contract is embodied.7 Whether or not a dis-
senting preferred shareholder will succeed in his action to have a plan en-
joined will depend upon whether the action proposed by the corporation is
sanctioned by the corporate charter. The direct method of elimination has
generally proved unavailing to the corporation on the ground that corpora-
tion statutes, which typically allow amendment of the charter to change
preferences of preferred stock 8 upon the vote of a majority or more of the
class of shareholders involved, are not broad enough to authorize the
elimination of accrued dividends. 9 On the other hand, the merger device,
3. This remedy is usually available in cases of merger. See PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 2852-908 (Purdon 1939); DEL. REv. CoDE c. 65, § 2093.61 (1935). In Ohio
the dissenter has this remedy under all three methods. See OHio GEN. CoDE ANN.
§8623-14, 15, 72 (Page Supp. 1952).
4. In general, these attempted injunctions will fail, at least in the merger or
indirect methods. See notes 10, 11 and 13 infra.
5. This strategy 'was successful in Patterson v. Durham Hosiery Mills, 214
N.C. 806, 200 S.E. 906 (1939), the only case found in which such a remedy was
granted.
6. DFL. R-v. CoDE c. 65, §2115 (1935) specifically provides that the statutory
provisions become part of the corporate charter. Where the corporation statutes
do not so provide, court decisions have made it clear that this is so. See, for ex-
ample, Beaver County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Winowich, 323 Pa. 483, 489, 187 At.
481, 484 (1936).
7. Provisions in the by-laws of the corporation and in the stock certificate may
also form part of the contract with the corporation.
8. See, e.g., DEi. REv. CODE c. 65, § 2058 (1935) allowing amendment of a
charter in order to reclassify capital stock by: "Changing the . . . preferences
. . . or other special rights of the shares. .. ."
9. Consolidated Film Industries, Inc. v. Johnson, 22 Del. Ch. 407, 197 AUt. 489
(Sup. Ct. 1937) ; Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 Atl. 115 (Sup. Ct.
1936); Patterson v. Henrietta Mills, 216 N.C. 728, 6 S.E.2d 531 (1940); Davison
v. Parker, Austin & Liscomb, 285 N.Y. 500, 35 N.E.2d. 618 (1941); Harbine v.
Pioneer Mech. Corp., 65 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1933) ; Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker,
Dayton Malleable Iron Co., 61 Ohio App. 1, 22 N.E.2d 281 (1939). Contra, Harr v.
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whereby a corporation with large accumulations on preferred stock merges
with another corporation and, in the process of rearranging the capital
structure of the two corporations, forces an exchange of the preferred plus
accruals for stock in the new corporation, has been almost universally al-
lowed. It has been permitted where the merger was between a defaulting
parent corporation and a wholly-owned, inactive subsidiary' 0 and even
where the subsidiary was created solely for the purposes of merger. 1 The
rationalization has been that existing statutes authorize merger upon ap-
proval of a majority of shareholders and that a necessary and foreseeable
concomitant of merger is elimination of any accrued dividends. 12 The use
of the indirect or optional method has been generally sanctioned by the
courts 13 on similar reasoning: the creation of a superior preferred stock is
allowed by a statute antedating the formation of the corporation and the
preferred shareholders have to bear the consequences of the exercise of this
power.14
403 Ill. 260, 85 N.E.2d 722 (1949). Thus only one state court of last resort has
allowed elimination of accrued .dividends under a statute of general wording similar
to that of Delaware allowing changes in "preferences, or . . . other special rights
of the shares." The Harr case, dealing with a Delaware corporation, was dis-
approved by the state court in Keller v. Wilson & Co., supra. Where a statute in
existence prior to formation of the corporation expressly allows elimination of accrued
dividends by charter amendment, the shareholder has consented in advance to such
a change and cannot complain. The situation that arises when such a statute is
passed subsequent to incorporation is discussed below.
10. Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (Sup. Ct.
1940).
11. Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 136 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1943).
Other cases permitting elimination by merger: Hubbard v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 42 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Pa. 1941); Windhurst v. Central Leather Co.,
107 N.J. Eq. 528, 153 Atl. 402 (Ct. Err. & App. 1931); Zobel v. American Loco-
motive Co., 182 Misc. 323, 44 N.Y.S.2d 33 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
12. This was made explicit by the court in Federal United Corp. v. Havender,
24 Del. Ch. 318, 334, 11 A.2d 331, 338 (Sup. Ct. 1940) :
"The average intelligent mind must be held to know that dividends may
accumulate on preferred stock, and that in the event of a merger of the corpora-
tion issuing the stock with another corporation, the various rights of share-
holders, including the right to dividends on preference stock accrued but unpaid,
may, and perhaps must, be the subject of reconcilement and adjustment; for, in
many cases, it would be impracticable to effect a merger if the rights attached
to the shares could not be dealt with."
This reasoning would have been unchallengeable had the merger been between two
separate corporations to unite their forces for more effective business operation.
But the merger was between a parent corporation and an inactive subsidiary. The
court could have accorded protection to accrued dividends by holding that the instant
merger was merely a guise to effect a forced elimination of accrued dividends which,
when attempted by direct amendment, had been forbidden by the same court in
Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 Atl. 115 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
13. Permitting elimination by issue of prior preferred: Johnson v. Fuller, 121
F.2d 618 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 681 (1941); Longson v. Beaux-Arts
Apts., 265 App. Div. 951, 38 N.Y.S.2d 605 (2d Dep't 1941), aff'd, 290 N.Y. 845,
50 N.E.2d 240 (1943); Shanik v. White Sewing Machine Corp., 25 Del. Ch. 371,
19 A.2d 831 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ; Kreicker v. Naylor Pipe Co., 374 Ill. 364, 29 N.E.2d
502 (1940); Johnson v. Lamprecht, 133 Ohio St. 567, 15 N.E.2d 127 (1938).
Contra, Patterson v. Durham Hosiery Mills, 214 N.C. 806, 200 S.E. 906 (1939).
14. This reasoning was well expressed by the Chancery Court in Shanik v.
White Sewing Machine. 25 Del. Ch. 154, 162, 15 A.2d 169, 173 (Ch. 1940), in com-
menting on two prior Delaware cases forbidding direct elimination:
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This anomalous pattern protects dividend arrearages from elimination
by the simplest method but leaves them prey to more devious plans. Jus-
tification may be attempted by reasoning that in a merger the dissenting
shareholder has the statutory remedy of having his shares appraised 15 and
purchased by the corporation, and under the indirect plan he is still pre-
ferred as to both accrued and future dividends over the common stock-
holders. But this rationalization does not ring true. The appraisal remedy
may give the dissenter little more than he would get if he sold his stock
on the open market, which he can do without benefit of statute if a direct
elimination is proposed. 16 As to the optional plan, the element relied on
by the corporation to make it a complete success is the pressure put on the
dissenters to make the exchange. If they accede, it is likely they will start
to receive current dividends; if they do not, their right to accrued dividends
may not be worth anything for several years since earnings may be just
enough to cover dividends on the new preferred.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS: THE SCHAAD CASE
Dissatisfaction with this patchwork theory of accrued dividend elimina-
tion 17 led several state legislatures to pass statutes specifically allowing the
elimination of accrued dividends by charter amendment approved by a
specified percentage of each class of shares.' 8 As a result the emphasis was
shifted in this area from the question of corporate power under existing
statutes to the constitutional problems of the right of the state under the
power reserved in its constitution to alter corporate charters.
In light of this shift of emphasis, a recent decision of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Schaad v. Hotel Easton Co. 19 is illuminating, not so
much for its holding as for its broad dictum on the constitutional question.
The corporation had been chartered in Pennsylvania in 1924. It had out-
standing 7158 out of an authorized 7500 shares of 7% cumulative, non-
voting preferred stock and 3039 out of an authorized 3500 shares of no-par
common stock. From its inception in 1924 through the year 1942, the cor-
poration suffered annual losses and incurred a deficit of over $250,000.
"Nevertheless, these cases by no means hold that language such as that of
the charter of this defendant should be construed to express or imply an under-
taking that accumulated dividends will in fact, and at all events, be paid; nor
an undertaking that the corporation will not make changes, permitted by the
statutes, in its capital structure, which may as a consequence reduce the proba-
bilities of actual payment of the dividends."
15. See note 3 supra.
16. See Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Shareholders Under Appraisal Statutes,
45 HA~v. L. REv. 233 (1931).
17. The decision in Harbine v. Dayton Malleable Iron Co., 61 Ohio App. 1,
22 N.E.2d 281 (1939) enjoining direct elimination was followed the same year by a
legislative amendment expressly permitting such elimination. A similar decision of
the New York court in Davis v. Parke, Austin & Liscomb, 285 N.Y. 500, 35 N.E.2d
618 (1941) was followed within two years by similar action by the New York
legislature. See note 18 infra.
18. N.Y. STOCK CoR'. LAw § 35(3); OHio GEN. CoDE ANx. § 8623-14, 15
(Page Supp. 1952); VA. ConE tit. 13, §§ 13-35, 37 (1950).
19. 369 Pa. 486, 87 A.2d 227 (1952).
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From 1943 to 1948 it made profits resulting in a reduction of the deficit to
$60,000. No dividends had ever been paid and accruals on the preferred
amounted to $157 per share at the start of 1949. In February of that year
the charter was amended to provide for an increase of common shares from
3500 to 75,000 and for a compulsory exchange of each share of preferred
plus accrued dividends for 10 shares of common. Only 1% of the outstand-
ing shares of each class voted against the amendment.20 Plaintiff, a dis-
senting preferred shareholder, brought suit to enjoin the corporation from
proceeding with the plan. After threading its way through Pennsylvania's
corporation law, the court found that the applicable statute empowered a
business corporation
"To increase or diminish its authorized capital stock, or to re-
classify the same by changing the number, par value, designations,
preferences, or relative, particpating, optional or other special rights
of the shares, or the qualifications, limitations, or restrictions of such
rights, or by changing shares with par value into shares without par
value . . . and in any and as many other respects as desired.
21
These broad powers were qualified, however, by a provision that
"This act shall not impair or affect any . . . right accruing,
accrued, or acquired . . . prior to the time this act takes effect, but
the same may be enjoyed, asserted, enforced . . . as fully and to the
same extent as if this act had not been passed." 2
These provisions were passed in 1933, after the corporation had been
formed and the stock issued. The court indicated that the first provision
might be broad enough to permit the changes attempted, but held that the
second provision prevented the proposed cancellation of the arrearages.
The holding in this case appears correct under the present state of
corporation law in Pennsylvania, subject to one question which was not
raised by counsel in the case or specifically considered by the court. The
saving clause provides that the Act ". . . shall not impair or affect any
. . . right accruing, accrued, or acquired . . . prior to the time this
act takes effect . . ." It could be argued that arrearages attributable to
the years after 1933 could be eliminated by amendment since these did not
accrue prior to the time the act took effect. The answer to such an argu-
ment by the corporation, and the one inferentially adopted by the courtm
is that while some of the dividends in question did not accrue or "vest"
until after 1933, the right to have unpaid dividends accumulate was acquired
20. This information is found scattered through the transcript of Record. It is
collected, unopposed by any counter statement of Appellees, at pp. 8-11 of Brief
for Appellants, Schaad v. Hotel Easton Co., .rupra note 19.
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-801 (Purdon 1938).
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-5 (Purdon 1938).
23. 369 Pa. 486, 496-497, 87 A.2d 227, 232 (1952).
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prior to 1933, and to permit elimination of post-1933 accruals would be to
impair this right. Thus the court- is protecting not only those rights which
might be deemed "vested" but all contract rights of the shareholder. One
effect of such a holding is that pre-1933 corporations are unable to eliminate
the cumulative feature as to future dividends, a power which is accorded
to both Delaware and New York corporations.
24
The Dictum.-The holding made it unnecessary to decide the question
of whether the grant of power in the first provision would be constitutional
as an exercise of the state's reserve power to alter or amend corporate
charters. But Justice (now Chief Justice) Stern went on to say:
". . .while there is conflict of authority on the subject, the
preferable view would seem to be that this reserved power of the State
to alter or amend charters of incorporation, although wide, is not
unlimited, and that it can be properly exercised only to amend a char-
ter so far as it represents a contract between the corporation and the
State, and not in respects as to which it constitutes a contract between
the corporation and the shareholders or between the shareholders them-
selves. . . . Any attempted statutory authorization of a corporation
to destroy the preferential right to the accrued dividends would seem
to involve either an unconstitutional deprivation of property, or an
impairment of the obligation of contracts, or both, and this notwith-
standing the reserved power of amendment." 2
This dictum would appear to block any attempt by the legislature to allow
direct removal of accrued dividends, as well as changes in any of the other
rights of stock ownership.
The neat division of the corporate charter into a contract 1) between
the state and the corporation, 2) between the corporation and the share-
holders, and 3) between the shareholders inter sese, with only the first of
the three capable of being altered by the state under the reserve power, is
a thesis which the writer of the opinion in the instant case had elaborated in
an article published in 1905.2 The view there expressed was that things
24. Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Atl. 696 (Ch.
1923) ; see McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 845, 54 N.Y.S.2d 253, 262
(Sup. Ct. 1945).
As to the other two methods of arrearage elimination, Pennsylvania appears to
be in line with the pattern prevailing in Delaware and other states. A federal court
has sustained the use of the optional method by a Pennsylvania corporation, Johnson
v. Fuller, 121 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1941), affirming 36 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Pa. 1940),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 681 (1941) and a Pennsylvania statute permits the merger of
corporations and restricts dissenting shareholders to the appraisal remedy, PA. STAT.
Axin. tit. 15, § 2852-908 (Purdon 1938). Hubbard v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
42 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Pa. 1941) permitted the elimination of accrued dividends in
connection with the merger of a parent corporation and two wholly owned subsidi-
aries.
25. 369 Pa. 486, 497-498, 87 A.2d 227, 232 (1952).
26. Stern, The Limitations of the Power of a State under a Reserved Right
to Amend or Repeal Charters of Incorporation, 53 Amd. L. REG. 1-47, 73-111, 145-
169 (1905).
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affirmatively granted to the corporation by the state-such as the franchise
itself or exception from general taxation---could be reached by the reserve
power,27 but that matters agreed upon by the shareholders among them-
selves and with the corporate entity, such as division of profits and voting
rights, did not, simply by being recited in the corporate charter issued by
the state, become subject to the reserve power, but were protected from
impairment by the contract clause of the Federal Constitution just as any
other contract between individuals, notwithstanding the reserve power.
28
The writer admitted that the cases up to that time did not support his
analysis. 9 In his opinion in the instant case, however, he asserts that his
view is presently held "by many, if not most, of the courts which have con-
sidered the question." 30 But of the nine cases cited in support of this
proposition, at least five do not reach the constitutional question.
8 '
Further, the tripartite division of the corporate charter is not helpful
in the solution of problems. It would be difficult to think of any alteration
of the corporate charter by the state that did not affect conditions which
the shareholder might reasonably think were part of his bargain with the
corporation or his compact with the other shareholders. This difficulty is
apparent even in Justice Stem's 1905 article. There, in dealing with the
contract between the state and the corporation, he cites with approval a
case upholding the power of the state to require a railroad to extend its
road beyond the route provided for in the franchise. The justification
advanced was that since the state might repeal the franchise altogether,
it could impose conditions upon its exercise, the corporation having the
alternative of accepting the condition or dissolving.32 In treating the
contract between the corporation and the shareholders, he criticizes a deci-
sion allowing a railroad corporation, under an enabling statute requiring
a majority vote of shareholders, to change the termini of the road from
those named in the charter over the protest of minority shareholders. The
decision is said to be bad because the shareholders had privately agreed
upon the termini set forth in the charter and therefore this contract between
the shareholders could not be reached by the state's reserve power clause.83
27. Id. at 17-19.
28. Id. at 74, 75.
29. Id. at 86.
30. Schaad v. Hotel Easton Co., 369 Pa. 486, 497, 87 A.2d 227, 232 (1952).
31. Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434 (1932) (contract was between corporation
and third persons; the Court asserts at p. 441, "The corporate charter may be re-
pealed or amended, and, within limits not now necessary to define, the interrelations
of state, corporation and stockholders may be changed . . ."); Keller v. Wilson
& Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 Atl. 115 (Sup. Ct. 1936) ; Consolidated Film Industries,
Inc. v. Johnson, 22 Del. Ch. 407, 197 Atl. 489 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (holding that statute
did not confer the power which the corporation attempted to exercise); Sutton v.
Globe Knitting Works, 276 Mich. 200, 267 N.W. 815 (1936) (statute contained a
saving clause similar to that relied on in the instant case); Hueftle v. Farmers
Elevator, 145 Neb. 424, 16 N.W.2d 855 (1944) (corporation attempted the change
without benefit of a statute.)
32. Stern, mupra note 26, at 21.
33. Id. at 103.
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Many eminent courts have not adopted the view advanced here by the
Pennsylvania court. Typically, in Looker v. Maynard 84 the United States
Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of a statute which gave all
corporation stockholders the right to vote their stock cumulatively in the
election of directors, although the corporate charter in question was in
existence prior to the statute and provided that each share of stock should
have but one vote for each director. It has also been held that the legis-
lature or a required number of shareholders may amend so as to alter the
capital stock,35 shareholders' liability 3 6 and the objects and purposes of
the corporation.3 r All these features would be viewed as part of the con-
tract between corporation and shareholder or between the shareholders
inter sese.
Probable restrictions on the dictum.-Under present corporation law
in Pennsylvania the effect of the holding in the Schaad case as to Pennsyl-
vania corporations organized before 1933 is clear: they will be enjoined
from eliminating accrued dividends by direct charter amendment and from
effecting other changes in the various rights of stock ownership, not per-
mitted by statutes antedating their existence. The dictum makes it plain
that the legislature cannot constitutionally authorize pre-1933 corporations
to make such changes. The broad language employed raises the question
of whether the dictum does not go even farther and block changes of the
rights of shareholders regardless of the date when the corporation was
formed. The opinion declares that a state may not amend a corporate char-
ter in respects as to which it constitutes a contract between the corporation
and the shareholders or between the shareholders themselves. If the state
passes a law permitting less than all of the shareholders to amend the
charter in certain respects, as for instance to remove pre-emptive rights
or change preferences, the exercise of the power is in effect an amendment of
the corporate charter by the state.38 As applied to corporations formed
after the passage of the statute, the dictum suggests that such action would
be unconstitutional since preferences and pre-emptive rights are part of the
contract between the corporation and the shareholders. The effect of such
reasoning would be to prevent any adjustments of rights among share-
holders without unanimous consent. Thus the vote of a few dissenting
shareholders could thwart a change in capital structure that might be
necessary for the corporation to avoid a financial crisis.3 9
34. 179 U.S. 46 (1900).
35. Haggard v. Lexington Utilities Co., 260 Ky. 261, 84 S.W.2d 84 (1935);
Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Consolidated Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., 148 Md. 90, 129
Atl. 22 (1925).
36. Sherman v. Smith, 1 Black 587 (U.S. 1861) ; Farbstein v. Pacific Oil Tool
Co., 127 Cal. App. 157, 15 P.2d 766 (1932).
37. Henry v. Markesan State Bank, 68 F.2d 554 (8th Cir. 1934); Picard v.
Hughey, 58 Ohio St. 577, 51 N.E. 133 (1898).
38. Stem, supra note 26, at 77, 83.
39. For example, enjoining the corporation from abrogating redemptive rights
would force it to redeem, thus draining off funds vital to the corporation's existence.
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An examination of the opinion in the light of Justice Stern's article,
on which the dictum builds, points to the conclusion that this extreme posi-
tion probably was not intended. The article deals with the power of the
state to make or authorize changes in corporate charters under the reserved
power. The thrust of the article is that "the reserved power to alter, amend,
or repeal a charter is a power reserved by the state as a private party to a
contract and not as a sovereign agency of government" 40 and thus cannot
extend to the contract among shareholders to which the state is not a party.
But this view does not mean that the state, acting in its sovereign capacity
quite apart from the reserved power, cannot pass laws regulating the con-
duct of corporations, including the manner in which future corporations may
amend their charters. Assuming that the dictum will be so restricted, con-
stitutional objections based on the contract clause should be no obstacle
to corporate action under such statutes, because statutes in existence at
the time of formation of the corporation become part of any contract
entered into pursuant to the corporation law.
41
Further limitations in Pennsylvania.-Two remaining problems are
presented by the Schaad case. The first is whether the 1933 statute is
broad enough to authorize the elimination of accrued dividends by subse-
quently formed corporations. The opinion does not give a definite answer
to the question, but in discussing another Pennsylvania corporation stat-
ute 42 says:
"Merely because a statute may authorize a corporation to re-
fashion its capital structure or reclassify its stock by altering prefer-
ential provisions or other terms would not, in the absence of a clear
expression of intention to the contrary, warrant an interpretation that
would permit the deprivation of dissenting preferred shareholders of
their rights in regard to accrued, unpaid, cumulative dividends." 43
It would appear that the court would require an authorization to eliminate
accrued dividends to be put in "words of one syllable" as other courts
confronted with similar statutes have required."
40. Stern, supra note 26, at 11. The author is apparently referring to a situation
where the state has a direct interest in the workings of the corporation, such as a
railroad, rather than an indirect interest as in the case of a tin can manufacturer.
41. See note 6, supra.
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 165-166 (Purdon 1938). This act, in general
terms, allowed a corporation to refashion its capital structure. It was in effect at
the time defendant hotel was incorporated but was repealed before suit was instituted
in the instant case. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §223, note (Purdon 1938).
43. Schaad v. Hotel Easton Co., 369 Pa. 486, 495, 87 A.2d 227, 231 (1952).
44. For example in Delaware, following the decision in Morris v. American
Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Atl. 696 (Ch. 1923), holding that a statute
allowing amendment of the corporate charter to change preferences did not authorize
elimination of accrued dividends, the statute was amended to allow changes in
". .. preferences, or relative, participating, optional or other special rights of the
shares. . . ." DEI, REv. CoDz ec. 65 §2058 (1935). (Italics added). The Supreme
Court of Delaware overruled the Chancery Court and ruled that even this language
did not empower the corporation to eliminate accrued dividends by charter amend-
ment. Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 Atl. 115 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
The Pennsylvania statute is similar to that of Delaware.
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The second question is presented by the limited nature of the Penn-
sylvania reserve power clause which permits the legislature to amend a cor-
porate charter ". . . whenever in their opinion it may be injurious to
the citizens of this Commonwealth, in such manner, however, that no in-
justice shall be done to the corporators." 45 Thus, even if the court were
to retreat from the position apparently taken in the dictum, there would
still remain the question whether a particular amendment of the corporate
charter, either as it represents a contract between the state and the cor-
poration, or the corporation and the stockholders, complied with these con-
ditions. The court says that whether or not these conditions are met is a
judicial question which in the instant case, apart from all other considera-
tions, it would answer in the negative.46 Providing the dissenting share-
holder with the remedy of appraisal and purchase of his stock would seem
to fulfill the requirement of protecting the corporators from injustice; 47
and there is language from cases in other states to the effect that permitting
corporations to shed the burden of dividend arrearages and undertake the
financing necessary for-survival is a matter of public concern, vital to the
economic well-being of the state.48 A forceful presentation of this point of
view might lead the Pennsylvania court to conclude that this condition
to the exercise of the reserve power-no injury to the Commonwealth-
had been satisfied.4 9
Treatment in other states.-The constitutional question with specific
reference to the direct elimination of accrued dividends has been raised in
two of the three jurisdictions that have passed statutes explicitly allowing
such elimination. 0 In both instances, the corporations had been formed
and had issued stock prior to the statutes and, after passage of the statute,
45. PA. CoNsT., Art. XVI, § 10 (Purdon 1930).
46. 369 Pa. 486, 498, 87 A.2d 227, 233 (1952).
47. See Note, 57 HARv. L. REv. 894, 898 (1944), which concludes that the ex-
istence of an appraisal remedy would forestall any objection that the elimination of
arrearages was an unconstitutional taking of property. This constitutional safe-
guard would seem analogous to the Pennsylvania protection against injustice to
the corporators.
48. E.g., McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 54 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Sup. Ct.
1945). This court also suggests that whether the amendment is necessary to the
public welfare is a matter for the legislature to decide.
49. Note that the Schaad case is dealing with the Pennsylvania Business Cor-
poration Law. This law is not applicable to corporations subject to the supervision
of the Department of Banking, the Insurance Department, the Pennsylvania Public
Utility Commission, or the Water and Power Resources Board. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 2852-4(3) (Purdon 1952). The law relating to such corporations permits
amendments of the corporate charter in language as broad as the Business Corpora-
tion Law and contains no saving clause. However, it gives a dissenting shareholder
the remedy of appraisal and payment in all cases of amendments. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 224 (Purdon Supp. 1952). This law was passed in 1949 and will pre-
sent the impairment of contracts problem with respect to most of the existing
corporations subject to it. Because of the vital public interest in such corporations,
it might be argued that the charter, even as it represents a contract between the
corporation and the shareholders, is subject to the reserve power. The same argu-
ment would meet the limitation that the reserve power must be exercised only in the
public interest.
50. New York, Ohio, and Virginia. The statutes are cited in n. 18, supra.
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attempted to eliminate accrued dividends directly by charter amendment.
In McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane,51 a New York trial court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the statute as applied to the action in question and, after
commenting that the right to accrued dividends is not in the nature of a
debt which the shareholder could sue on, said,
"The contract between the stockholder inter sese is not an uncon-
ditional contract. It is a contract subject to a condition that it may be
changed or altered in the manner prescribed or authorized by the
Legislature. Of course, if a right to a specific sum of money has
accrued, this right would be preserved against impairment by the con-
stitutional provision protecting property, but that is because this prop-
erty right exists separate and apart from and in addition to the contract.
The very essence of the reserved power of the Legislature is to enable
it to change preferential rights of the different classes of stock in a
corporation .. ' 52
The court then added:
"It is no more unconstitutional to permit the Legislature, under
the reserved power, to authorize a corporation to abolish dividends
which have accrued in the past, than it is to authorize a corporation to
abolish dividends which may accrue in the future. There is a difference
in degree, but not one of kind. In both cases there is interference
with a contractual relationship between stockholders and the corpora-
tion or between the stockholders inter sese. But this the legislature is
permitted to do, certainly under the reserved power in the Constitution
and in the General Corporation Law, to alter or amend the charters of
corporations, if not under the inherent power of the state for the
preservation of the general welfare." 53
51. 184 Misc. 835, 54 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Sup. Ct. 1945). This case was cited with
approval by the New York Court of Appeals, but in a case involving different issues:
Anderson v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 295 N.Y. 343, 351, 67 N.E.2d
573, 577 (1946). It was followed in Arstein v. Roberts Reis & Co., 77 N.Y.S.2d
303 aff'd without opinion 273 App. Div. 963, 79 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1st Dep't),
leave to appeal denied, 298 N.Y. 931, 81 N.E.2d 335, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 860
(1948).
52. 184 Misc. 835, 843, 54 N.Y.S.2d 253, 260 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
53. Id. at 845, 54 N.Y.S.2d at 263. The court here assumes that there would
be no constitutional problems involved in the alteration of the dividend rate for the
future or the elimination of the accrual feature for the future without the benefit
of a prior statute or charter provision authorizing such action. As a matter of
fact, litigation on this point is rare since prior statutes, of which the Delaware
statute allowing changes in preferences is typical, have been held to authorize such
action. Thus the stockholder has accepted the possibility of such change as one
of the terms of his contract and cannot complain. Courts, desirous of protecting the
right to accrued dividends, termed it a "vested right" to distinguish it from the
right to future cumulative dividends. See, e.g., Morris v. American Public Utilities
Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Atl. 696 (Ch. 1923) and Keller v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 21
Del. Ch. 391, 190 Atl. 115 (Sup. Ct. 1936). Speculation today as to whether the
right to accrued dividends is of a different nature than the right to future dividends
is futile. The proper question is whether it is proper to eliminate accrued dividends
by the direct, as well as by other, methods and if so under what conditions.
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The opposite result was reached by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Wheatley
v. A. I. Root Co.54 on the ground that such an application of the statute
was an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of the contract of the
preferred shareholders.
Thus a state court confronted with the problem today would have
precedent to decide either way. In view of the fact that accrued dividend
elimination is permitted by merger and by the indirect method, it seems
incongruous to deny, as the Schaad case did, the corporation the power
to eliminate accrued dividends by the simplest and most convenient method.
The reason for denying the constitutionality of statutes authorizing direct
elimination of accrued dividends by corporations in existence prior to the
statute is that the reserved power clause, embodied in a statute antedating
the corporation, did not give preferred shareholders notice that power to
make such a change in the corporate charter was reserved by the state. 55
But, by the same token, it is equally probable that preferred shareholders
did not contemplate that their accrued dividends could be eliminated by
merger or by the indirect method. The preferred shareholder probably
believed that his accrued dividends 'would not be subject to impairment.
It is unlikely that he even contemplated what his rights would be where
the corporation had no earnings and paid no dividends over a period of
ten to fifteen years and where a majority or larger percentage of his own
class of shares voted in favor of eliminating the accruals due them to enable
the corporation to obtain needed working capital. No distinction there-
fore should be drawn between the three methods on the ground of notice
to the shareholder. If elimination is allowed by one method it should be
allowed by all three.
.A SUGGFSTED APPROACH
The judicial preoccupation with the questions of corporate power and
later with the constitutionality of subsequent statutes has tended to obscure
what should be the focal point of such cases-whether the plan adopted is
fair to the preferred shareholders.56 A finding that power exists in the cor-
poration to effect an elimination of accrued dividends by any of the three
methods should not conclude the issue, hiding the fact that the power may
54. 147 Ohio St. 127, 69 N.E.2d 187 (1946). This decision was followed in
Schaffner v. Standard Boiler and Plate Iron Co., 150 Ohio St., 454, 83 N.E.2d 192
(1948).
55. This is apparent in such cases as Consolidated Film Industries v. Johnson,
22 Del. Ch. 407, 415, 197 Atl. 489, 493, (Sup. Ct. 1937) and Keller v. Wilson & Co.,
21 Del. Ch. 391, 414, 190 Atl. 115, 126 (Sup. Ct. 1936), which enjoin the plan because
the stockholder had not consented to such a term in his contract; and Federal United
Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1940) and Shanik v.
White Sewing Machine Corp., 25 Del. Ch. 371, 19 A.2d 831 (Sup. Ct. 1941), which
say that a stockholder should be aware that his accrued dividends might be impaired
through merger or issuance of a prior preferred stock, both permitted by statute.
56. In the series of Delaware cases, note 55 supra, no point was made as to
whether preferred shareholders were being accorded fair treatment; the issue was
simply one of corporate power. In the two cases squarely presenting the constitutional
problem, the solution of this issue decided the case with no consideration of what the
preferred shareholder was getting in exchange for what he was giving up.
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be exercised mainly for the benefit of common shareholders to the decided
disadvantage of preferred shareholders. Nor should generalized state-
ments about the best interests of the corporation or the difficulty of financing
when there are heavy arrearages serve to justify the corporate action.
5
7
As a matter of fact the idealized picture of the corporation, desiring to
eliminate arrearages because it is in need of funds and has only the alter-
native of issuing common stock open to it, is not always accurate. One
authority reports, without elaboration, that not a single instance was found
where a recapitalization plan eliminating accruals led to common stock
financing.58 This statement is rather startling since need for financing is
the most common justification given by the courts for allowing accrual
elimination 5 and should lead the courts to consider the problem from a
viewpoint other than that of corporate power alone.
The fact that the plan eliminating accruals has the actual approval of
at least a majority of the class of shareholders affected and that it seldom
appears that more than an insignificant number of preferred shareholders
oppose it may allay any feeling on the part of the judiciary that the plan
is not fair and ultimately in the best interests of the preferred shareholders.
But the protection afforded by the right to vote on the plan is questionable.
Directors control the manner in which the plan is presented to stockholders,
and in soliciting proxies can emphasize any advantages which the plan is
supposed to confer on preferred shareholders, while minimizing its dis-
advantages. Further, capital impairment is likely to exist where there is
a substantial amount of accrued dividends. Under most state corporation
laws this will prevent the payment of any dividends, 0 but the impairment
can be corrected by a reduction of capital. This, however, will require the
vote of common shareholders,"' who may refuse to agree to such a reduc-
tion unless the preferred shareholders vote to relinguish their accrued divi-
dends. Approval of the, plan by a majority of preferred shareholders,
therefore, should not be conclusive in assessing its fairness.
One suggested approach to the problem is that the corporation be re-
quired to prove the necessity for the elimination of accrued dividends as a
prerequisite for approval of the plan. This would include proof of the need
for fresh funds and of a bona fide intention to issue common stock as the
method of financing of the plan is approved. The corporation would also
be required to prove that there is no alternative solution of the problem
which would have less effect on the relative priorities of the classes of
57. Typical of such generalizations are those found in Hottenstein v. York Ice
Machinery Corp., 136 F.2d 944, (3d Cir. 1943); Zobel v. American Locomotive
Co., 182 Misc. 323, 44 N.Y.S.2d 33 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Blumenthal v. Di Giorgio
Fruit Corp., 30 Cal. App.2d 11, 85 P.2d 580 (1938).
58. Dodd, Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations, 55 HARV. L. REv. 780, 783
(1942).
59. See cases cited in note 55 supra.
60. See, for example, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-701 (Purdon 1938); N.J.
STAT. ANN. c. 14 § 8-19 (1939) ; N.Y. STocx CopoRAioN LAW § 58.
61. See, for example, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-706 (Purdon 1938); DEl.
REv. CoaE- §2060 (1935).
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stock.6 This approach is but a partial solution, for once it is decided that
elimination of accrued dividends is necessary, the shifting of future equities
in the corporation from the common to the preferred stock is capable of
infinite variation. It would have to be annexed to a plan such as that sug-
gested by Professor Dodd,3 under which the future earning power of the
corporation is estimated to determine whether the junior stock has a rea-
sonable expectation of receiving earnings in the future with the accruals
in existence. This possibility of future earnings is then "capitalized" to
determine what share of the equity of the corporation the junior stock
should be given after accruals are eliminated. While this approach can
obtain no more than uncertain predictions, it would have the effect at least
of directing the attention of the courts specifically to what preferred share-
holders are being forced to surrender and what common shareholders are
gaining under accrual elimination plans as they are now being sanctioned.
In addition to the above suggestion, state corporation laws should be
amended to give the dissenting shareholder an appraisal remedy under all
of the three methods used to eliminate accrued dividends." Further, courts
should refuse to sanction elimination of accrued dividends to the extent
that there is presently a surplus available out of which dividends may be
paid.
In allowing use of the direct method upon a showing of necessity and
fairness, the suggested approach would be more favorable to the corpora-
tion than the present law, which results generally in a flat injunction against
the plan. This approach would also be more favorable to dissenters than
the present law, by permitting them to enjoin merger and optional-method
plans unless the corporation demonstrates necessity and fairness,65 and by
giving dissenters the remedy of appraisal and sale.
Allowing mergers which eliminate accrued dividends, restricting pre-
ferred shareholders to the appraisal remedy, is .ow fairly well entrenched
in statute and case law. Excepting this method from the suggested solu-
tion might be justified on the ground that mergers are usually attempted to
achieve a beneficial union of two going concerns and not solely to eliminate
accrued dividends and should be unhampered by suits of minority share-
holders protesting the incidental elimination of their accruals. Where,
however, the merger is patently a device to effect accrual elimination, as for
instance a merger of a parent and inactive subsidiary, it should meet the
scrutiny of the suggested solution.
62. Becht, Alteratimos of Accrued Dividetds: II, 49 MIcE. L. REv. 565, 592-594
(1951).
63. Dodd, Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations, 55 HA.v. L. REv. 780, 793-796
(1942).
64. This is now done under N.Y. SrocK Coap. LAW § 21; OHIo GEN. CODE
ANN. § 8623-14, 15, 72 (Supp. 1940). In Pennyslvania the dissenting shareholder
is entitled to the appraisal remedy only in cases of merger. See note 2, sutpra.
65. Injunctions are not allowed in these situations. See cases cited in notes
10, 11, and 13 supra.
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